I. DISCRETE ADAPTIVE GAMES

A. Introduction
In the last few years, physicists have become very interested in discrete games. In these models, a finite number of players or agents pick from a finite set of actions (possibly varying from agent to agent), at discrete times, and receive rewards that depend on their own and the other agents' actions. Each agent chooses according to a rule called its strategy; if agents have more than one strategy available, they use a meta-strategy to chose among them.
As described, the setting fits classical game theory [1, 2] , where the agents have rational expectations and common knowledge of the structure of the game, and maximize their reward. In contrast, physicists always use boundedly rational agents [3] . However, econophysicists use neither economic models of bounded rationality [4, 5] , nor experimental findings about human cognition [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . For instance, their models never incorporate the well-supported meta-strategy of satisficing, that is, an agent searching over its options and taking the first one it finds with a satisfactory reward [12] [13] [14] . Econophysical strategies are all, so far as we know, of the following form. Each agent remembers a simple summary statistic (e.g., the best action to have taken) for each of the last m turns of the game. For each such history, a strategy specifies an action to take. Rather than maximizing, or even satisficing, they employ adaptive meta-strategies tending to select strategies that did well in the recent past.
These caricatures or toy models have been studied since the 1980s, because, it is said, they (1) shed light on real learning and mutual adaptation, and (2) show sur- * Electronic address: shalizi@santafe.edu † Electronic address: albers@cow.physics.wisc.edu prisingly complex behavior. In this paper, we examine two forms this complexity is held to take -deterministic chaos, which is a sort of dynamical complexity, and formally measured complexity, specifically the amount of information embedded in the system. The rest of this section describes the most popular discrete adaptive games, the minority game and the El Farol Bar problem. The next section introduces the tools from symbolic dynamics, particularly subshifts of finite type, which we will use to pry open the mechanisms of these games. We show that the games are non-chaotic, and put linear upper bounds on their complexities. We discuss how to extend our results to games with either memories of unlimited length, or noisy play. We then consider what you must do to a game to make it chaotic, if you want it to be. In closing, we suggest a way to reconcile our findings with common observations on these games, and draw a moral for econophysics.
B. Examples: El Farol and the Minority Game
The best-loved game in econophysics is the minority game of Challet and Zhang [15] , the subject of a rapidly growing literature (see http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/minority/). There are N agents, each of which can make only one of two moves: play "0" or play "1". If most agents play 0, then those who play 1 win, and vice-versa. (N is always odd.) Each player remembers whether 0 or 1 won on each of the last m turns. Strategies, again, are rules mapping histories to actions; each agent has s of them. Agents keep track of how many times each of their strategies would have won, and uses the strategy with the best record over the time it can remember. Ties between strategies are broken randomly or pseudorandomly (say, by assigning strategies a random order at the beginning of the game).
Traditionally, the minority game has been studied either using the brute empiricism of simulations, or with statistical-mechanical methods, particularly those employing the thermodynamic limit. Recently, Jeffries, Johnson et al. have introduced methods owing more to dynamical systems, e.g., de Bruijn graphs over possible sequences of winning outcomes [16, 17] . Our approach here is related to theirs, but is even more deterministic, and more microscopic.
The minority game descends from W. B. Arthur's El Farol Bar Problem [18] . There are 100 people in Santa Fe who go out to bars; El Farol is the only good bar. Normally, those who go there are better off than those who stay home and watch the stars. But El Farol's small, and if more than 40 people go, crowding makes the bargoers worse off than stay-at-at-homes. Everyone knows how many people went to the bar on each of the last m nights. Strategies, again, map histories to actionsstaying home or going to the bar.
Rather than statistical mechanics, the traditional approaches to the El Farol problem are those of evolutionary adaptation and inductive behavior. Many have sought to show that either the population of agents coevolves a set of mutually-tolerable strategies, or that a ceaseless evolutionary arms race forces everyone to "run as fast as they can just to stay in place" [2, 18] .
II. SYMBOLIC DYNAMICS, SHIFTS
We now lay out our mathematical tools, namely symbolic dynamics [19, 20] . We quote standard results without proofs, which you can find in any standard text on the subject, for instance Ref. [20] .
We start with a finite or countable alphabet X of symbols. From these we make strings or words over X, which are symbol sequences, x 0 x 1 x 2 . . . x n . Our shift space is a set of semi-infinite words, x = x 0 x 1 x 2 . . . x i . . .. The dynamics are given by a shift operator T :
The orbit of a point is its set of future iterates, x, T x, T 2 x, . . . . The standard metric between two sequences (points) x and y in the shift space is
where δ(a, b) is the Kronecker delta.
In general, not all words are allowed, i.e., not every semi-infinite word is in the shift space. If W (L) is the number of allowed words of length L, the topological entropy is
That is, h is the asymptotic exponential rate of growth in the number of allowed words. It measures the degree of exponential spreading in the dynamics. More precisely, when we can define Lyapunov exponents, the largest exponent λ 1 ≤ h [21] . Similarly, the metric entropy rate, Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy or information production rate h µ is always bounded above by the topological entropy, h ≥ h µ [21] . Let A be a square 0-1 matrix, with as many rows as X has symbols. Define a shift space X A where x is allowed iff ∀i, A (xi)(xi+1) = 1. Then X A is a subshift of finite type. We can also represent X A with a directed graph G A , where there is one node for each symbol, and an edge from i to j iff A ij = 1. Then x ∈ X A iff it is a path through G A .
Subshifts of finite type have a number of important properties. They are topologically transitive if dense orbits exist. They are irreducible if the graph of A is strongly connected. They are one-many if there are symbols i, j, k such that A ij = 1 and A ik = 1 but j = k. They are many-one if there are i, j, k such that A ik = 1 and A jk = 1 but i = j. They are one-one if they are neither many-one nor one-many. They are chaotic, in the sense of Devaney [22] , if they are topologically transitive and have a dense set of periodic points. If A is irreducible, then either X A is transitive or it consists of a single periodic orbit. If X A is transitive, then A is irreducible.
III. THE MINORITY GAME AS A SHIFT MAP
To do one iteration of the minority game, we need to know two things. (1) The history of the last m rounds -which action won on each of them. (2) The "gains" of all the strategies possessed by the agents -the number of times each strategy predicted the winning action in the last m rounds. These facts fix the action of each agent, and so the winner of the round. That is, the next state of the game is a deterministic function of its present state. (In what follows, "state" will always mean the global state of the game, never the state of an individual agent.)
Since each state variable takes only finitely many values, we can map the state as a whole into a finite alphabet. We order the states and their alphabetic symbols however we like. Then we build a square matrix A, where A ij = 1 if j follows i, and = 0 otherwise. X A defines a subshift of finite type over states of the minority game, and every run of the minority game is an allowed orbit of this subshift. We could write down A in some detail, but shan't.
Suppose memory for gains extends back indefinitely. Then the state comes from a countably infinite alphabet, rather than a finite one, but the subshift is still deterministic (many-one).
In the finite-memory case, the lack of chaos is elementary once we realize that there are only finitely many states; the full apparatus of symbolic dynamics is overkill. There are only finitely many symbols, so every string will eventually repeat a symbol. But each symbol has a unique successor, so after the first repetition, the string just repeats a single word. Hence every orbit is eventually periodic.
The topological entropy rate is zero. The first symbol of a string fixes all subsequent ones, so ∀L, W (L) = W (1), and h = 0 by Eq. 2.
Before we can say quantitative things about the complexity of a model, we must pick a complexity measure, of which there are far too many [19] . When people have discussed the complexity of discrete games at all, they have picked the Kolmogorov complexity. Unfortunately, this is simply a measure of randomness, which cannot be computed by any general procedure, or even reliably approximated [23] (pace those who try to calculate it for games, and even real markets [24, 25] ). Rather than simply estimating randomness, a good complexity measure should be low for both highly ordered and highly random processes; be calculable; and have a clear meaning, related to the dynamics of the process, rather than just being a number for its own sake [26] . To our knowledge, only one measure satisfies all these criteria, the statistical complexity of Refs. [27, 28] , which is the amount of information about the past of the process needed for maximally accurate prediction of its future.
We get the statistical complexity by finding the causal states of the system: each causal state is a distinct distribution for future events, conditional on the past of the system. The statistical complexity C µ is simply the entropy (uncertainty in bits) of the causal states = − i p i log 2 p i , where p i is the probability of the i th causal state. This is maximized when all causal states are equally probable. In the case of a periodic process, each phase is a causal state, and each state is equally probable, so C µ = log 2 P . [40] We have just seen that the minority game has only periodic orbits, so to get C µ , we just need the period. Start with just one strategy per agent. After the system has seen every possible history, it must repeat itself, so P ≤ 2 m . Now give each agent several strategies. The number of ways agents can deploy strategies is S ≤ s N . When we've gone through every possible history, the agents could be using different strategies than before. But once we've seen all deployments of strategies, we must be back where we started. Thus P ≤ S2 m ≤ s N 2 m . Even these bad estimates give us
The complexity grows linearly with memory and population at most. We get this growth rate only with complete (combinatorial) independence -an agent's strategy selection is constrained neither by the selections of other agents, nor even by the global history!
IV. INFINITE MEMORY FOR GAINS
People sometimes play the minority game with an infinite memory for gains -agents remember the number of times each strategy has won since the beginning of the game, rather than just in the last m turns. Then the alphabet is countably infinite. But what matters are the difference in strategies' gains, and if those are bounded, the finite-state arguments take over. Even when differences in gains are unbounded, the shift map is many-one, so there is just a single 1 in each row of the transition matrix T .
The topological entropy rate of a countable-state shift is [20, Observation 7.2.10]
independent of i. From many-oneness, the sum in Eq. 4 is always exactly 1, so h = 0. Let us consider also the question of exponential spreading.
The distance between points in the standard metric is at most 2. d(x, y) = 2 iff x i = y i for all i. In that case, d(T n x, T n y) = 2 for all n, so maximally-separated points stay maximally separated. On the other hand, if the distance between x and y is less than 2, then at some position, k, x k = y k . By the many-oneness of the shift, if j > k, x j = y j . Therefore, the distance between the iterates of x and y shrinks until it hits 0. Distance never increases; spreading of any sort, never mind exponential spreading, is impossible.
The distance between any two distinct periodic points is always maximal; that is, given two periodic points x and y, if x = y, then x i = y i for all i. To see this, consider first the case of two points on the same periodic cycle, of period P . For some 0 < L < P , T L (x) = y. Suppose that, for some k,
is periodic with period L < P , which is absurd. Now consider points on two distinct periodic cycles. Suppose there were a k such that x k = y k . Then T k (x) = T k (y). Hence there is a point, T k (x), belonging both to the x cycle and the y cycle. But this is absurd, because the cycles are distinct.
Suppose periodic points were dense. Then for any point x and any distance > 0, there would be a periodic point y = x such that d(x, y) ≤ . But if x it itself periodic, then we have just seen that d(x, y) = 2 no matter what periodic point y we chose. Therefore periodic points are not dense. Chaotic maps have dense periodic points, so this shift map isn't one.
V. NOISE
Traditionally, the minority game is played somewhat noisily -either players chose strategies with some degree of randomness, or the move they make, once they have chosen a strategy, is somewhat random. This makes the game amenable to statistical-mechanical treatment, a point which has been thoroughly explored elsewhere. Here, we will see that it can make the entropy rate positive, but does not increase the complexity.
The usual types of noise imposed in discrete games change them from deterministic maps into Markov chains. This means we can represent the state of the game at one time as a function of the state at the previous time, and a sequence of stationary, independent noise variables, i.e., x t+1 = f (x t , η t ), where {η t } are IID random variables which are also independent of the x t . The Markov property of the sequence {x t } also means that its entropy rate (metric or topological) is just the entropy of x t+1 conditional on x t [20, 23] . That is, h µ = H[x t+1 |x t ], and similarly for h. Now, applying some basic results of information theory [23, ch. 2] ,
Or, in words: because the only source of randomness is the noise, the entropy rate of the states must be no more than the entropy of the noise. A parallel argument holds for the topological entropy. Nothing in the process amplifies the noise. Now let us consider the statistical complexity. Recall that a causal state is a distinct distribution of the system's future behavior, conditional on its past. For noise of the sort described, the present state of the game determines the distribution of future symbols, independent of any other feature of the past of the system. So the present symbol fixes the causal state. The noise could make some causal states more likely than others (reducing the complexity), or could even lead to two symbols having the same distribution over future orbits, merging them into a single causal state (again lowering the complexity). Adding noise simplifies matters, if it does anything at all.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed the global behavior of discrete adaptive games, using symbolic dynamics. These games are not chaotic, and the most popular ones are actually of low complexity, at most linear in the number of agents.
The crucial obstacles to chaos were that the state of the minority game can be summarized in a discrete alphabet, and that the evolution of those states is many-one. Our results will apply, mutatis mutandis, to any deterministic adaptive game of which this is true, for instance, the El Farol problem and the discrete Farmer-Joshi market model [29] . To repeat, this is not an artifact of discretizing continuous models, but a feature of deliberately discrete ones. Nothing depends on the meta-strategy; our results hold with learning, imitation, evolution, etc., so long one implements them non-anticipatively.
A. Exponential Spreading versus Exponential Transients
Anyone who looks at a simulation of the minority game sees an intricate, hard-to-predict process -we certainly do. Scientists trained in nonlinear dynamics naturally look to exponential divergence of orbits to explain these observations. We have seen that there is no such divergence in the standard, noiseless version of these games; there are three ways to get it.
• Hidden information. If only some agents have access to a (changing) outside source of information, then there can be apparent transitivity in the game, and so deterministic chaos. A neat example is the Brock-Hommes asset-trading model [30] [31] [32] , where agents get simple adaptive strategies for free, but must pay for rational expectations of future prices.
• Add noise. As we've seen (Sec. V), this certainly allows exponential divergence, but in a trivial way, and at a cost in complexity.
• Cheat. Break ties using a chaotic shift map, or something similar. Often this will make the game chaotic.
Only the first of these mechanisms is at all attractive. In any case, none of them account for the phenomenology of ordinary deterministic games. We suggest that the answer lies not with exponentially fast divergence, but with exponentially slow convergence. For the minority game, it is numerically well established that relaxation times grow exponentially with m [33] . What is less appreciated is that, in high-dimensional dynamical systems, the approach to the attractor can be so slow that it is never reached in simulations, at least not within the lifespan of ordinary experimenters (but see [34] ). In systems formed by coupling smaller dynamical systems, such as the agents in our games, the duration of the transient epoch often grows exponentially with the number of agents [35] . The attractors and their invariant distributions are irrelevant; what matters is the structure of the attractor basin [36] and the quasi-stationary transient distribution it produces [37] . Once recognized, these long transients are actually a feature of discrete adaptive games, since the social systems they are supposed to model are essentially never in an invariant state, but always "in transition" [41] . The transients are, however, bad news for methods based on either ergodic or thermodynamic limits.
B. The Moral of the Story
The motive for studying models like the minority game should not be that they are complex systems in some formal sense. Rather the hope should be that these models portray, in stylized miniature, key aspects of real mutual adaptation and social interaction, and that studying the portrait will help us understand the original. This is not an outlandish hope, since profound insights have come from studying the equally-stylized Prisoners' Dilemma [38] , and a host of other, less famous models [2, 3, 39] have illuminated the life of political, boundedly-rational animals. We hope that the discrete adaptive games of econophysics will take their place in this set. The less effort is spent on physically (that is, socially) irrelevant problems -algorithmic complexities, stationary or thermodynamic limits, and so on -the sooner this will happen.
